Abstract. An additively-homomorphic encryption scheme enables us to compute linear functions of an encrypted input by manipulating only the ciphertexts. We define the relaxed notion of a semihomomorphic encryption scheme, where the plaintext can be recovered as long as the computed function does not increase the size of the input "too much". We show that a number of existing cryptosystems are captured by our relaxed notion. In particular, we give examples of semi-homomorphic encryption schemes based on lattices, subset sum and factoring. We then demonstrate how semi-homomorphic encryption schemes allow us to construct an efficient multiparty computation protocol for arithmetic circuits, UC-secure against a dishonest majority. The protocol consists of a preprocessing phase and an online phase. Neither the inputs nor the function to be computed have to be known during preprocessing. Moreover, the online phase is extremely efficient as it requires no cryptographic operations: the parties only need to exchange additive shares and verify information theoretic MACs. Our contribution is therefore twofold: from a theoretical point of view, we can base multiparty computation on a variety of different assumptions, while on the practical side we offer a protocol with better efficiency than any previous solution.
Introduction
The fascinating idea of computing on encrypted data can be traced back at least to a seminal paper by Rivest, Adleman and Dertouzos [RAD78] under the name of privacy homomorphism. A privacy homomorphism, or homomorphic encryption scheme in more modern terminology, is a public-key encryption scheme (G, E, D) for which it holds that D(E(a) ⊗ E(b)) = a ⊕ b, where (⊗, ⊕) are some group operation in the ciphertext and plaintext space respectively. For instance, if ⊕ represents modular addition in some ring, we call such a scheme additively-homomorphic. Intuitively a homomorphic encryption scheme enables two parties, say Alice and Bob, to perform secure computation: as an example, Alice could encrypt her input a under her public key, send the ciphertext E(a) to Bob; now by the homomorphic property, Bob can compute a ciphertext containing, e.g., E(a · b + c) and send it back to Alice, who can decrypt and learn the result. Thus, Bob has computed a non trivial function of the input a. However, Bob only sees an encryption of a which leaks no information on a itself, assuming that the encryption scheme is secure. Informally we will say that a set of parties P 1 , . . . , P n holding private inputs x 1 , . . . , x n securely compute a function of their inputs y = f (x 1 , . . . , x n ) if, by running some cryptographic protocol, the honest parties learn the correct output of the function y. In addition, even if (up to) n − 1 parties are corrupt and cooperate, they are not able to learn any information about the honest parties' inputs, no matter how they deviate from the specifications of the protocol.
Building secure multiparty computation (MPC) protocols for this case of dishonest majority is essential for several reasons: First, it is notoriously hard to handle dishonest majority efficiently and it is well known that unconditionally secure solutions do not exist. Therefore, we cannot avoid using some form of public-key technology which is typically much more expensive than the standard primitives used for honest majority (such as secret sharing). Secondly, security against dishonest majority is often the most natural to shoot for in applications, and is of course the only meaningful goal in the significant 2-party case. Thus, finding practical solutions for dishonest majority under reasonable assumptions is arguably the most important research goal with respect to applications of multiparty computation.
While fully-homomorphic encryption [Gen09] allows for significant improvement in communication complexity, it would incur a huge computational overhead with current state of the art. In this paper we take a different road: in a nutshell, we relax the requirements of homomorphic encryption so that we can implement it under a variety of assumptions, and we show how this weaker primitive is sufficient for efficient MPC. Our main contributions are:
A framework for semi-homomorphic encryption: we define the notion of a semi-homomorphic encryption modulo p, for a modulus p that is input to the key generation. Abstracting from the details, the encryption function is additively homomorphic and will accept any integer x as input plaintext. However, in contrast to what we usually require from a homomorphic cryptosystem, decryption returns the correct result modulo p only if x is numerically small enough. We demonstrate the generality of the framework by giving several examples of known cryptosystems that are semi-homomorphic or can be modified to be so by trivial adjustments. These include: the Okamoto-Uchiyama cryptosystem [OU98] ; Paillier cryptosystem [Pai99] and its generalization by Damgård and Jurik [DJ01]; Regev's LWE based cryptosystem [Reg05] ; the scheme of Damgård, Geisler and Krøigaard [DGK09] based on a subgroup-decision problem; the subset-sum based scheme by Lyubashevsky, Palacio and Segev [LPS10] ; Gentry, Halevi and Vaikuntanathan's scheme [GHV10] based on LWE, and van Dijk, Gentry, Halevi and Vaikuntanathan's scheme [DGHV10] based on the approximate gcd problem. We also show a zero-knowledge protocol for any semi-homomorphic cryptosystem, where a prover, given ciphertext C and public key pk, demonstrates that he knows plaintext x and randomness r such that C = E pk (x, r), and that x furthermore is numerically less than a given bound. We show that using a twist of the amortization technique of Cramer and Damgård [CD09] , one can give u such proofs in parallel where the soundness error is 2 −u and the cost per instance proved is essentially 2 encryption operations for both parties. The application of the technique from [CD09] to prove that a plaintext is bounded in size is new and of independent interest. Information-theoretic "online" MPC: we propose a UC secure [Can01] protocol for arithmetic multiparty computation that, in the presence of a trusted dealer who does not know the inputs, offers informationtheoretic security against an adaptive, malicious adversary that corrupts any dishonest majority of the parties. Using information-theoretic authentication for MPC has already been proposed by [RBO89] , where they apply so-called IC Signatures for the case of honest majority. The main idea of our protocol is that the parties will be given additive sharing of multiplicative triples [Bea91] , together with information theoretic MACs of their shares -forcing the parties to use the correct shares during the protocol. This online phase is essentially optimal, as no symmetric or public-key cryptography is used, matching the efficiency of passive protocols for honest majority like [BOGW88, CCD88] . Concretely, each party performs O(n 2 ) multiplications modulo p to evaluate a secure multiplication. This improves on the previous protocol of Damgård and Orlandi (DO) [DO10] where a Pedersen commitment was published for every shared value. Getting rid of the commitments we improve on efficiency (a factor of Ω(κ), where κ is the security parameter) and security (information theoretic against computational). Implementation results for the two-party case indicate about 6 msec per multiplication (see Appendix B), at least an order of magnitude faster than that of DO on the same platform. Moreover, in DO the modulus p of the computation had to match the prime order of the group where the commitments live. Here, we can, however, choose p freely to match the application which typically allows much smaller values of p.
An efficient implementation of the offline phase: we show how to replace the share dealer for the online phase by a protocol based solely on semi-homomorphic encryption 1 . Our offline phase is UC-secure against any dishonest majority, and it matches the lower bound for secure computation with dishonest majority of O(n 2 ) public-key operations per multiplication gate [HIK07] . In the most efficient instantiation, the offline phase of DO requires security of Paillier encryption and hardness of discrete logarithms. Our offline phase only has to assume security of Paillier cryptosystem and achieves similar efficiency: A count of operations suggests that our offline phase is as efficient as DO up to a small constant factor (about 2-3). Preliminary implementation results indicate about 2-3 sec to prepare a multiplication. Since we generalize to any semi-homomorphic scheme including Regev's scheme, we get the first potentially practical solution for dishonest majority that is believed to withstand a quantum attack. It is not possible to achieve UC security for dishonest majority without set-up assumptions, and our protocol works in the registered public-key model of [BCNP04] where we assume that public keys for all parties are known, and corrupted parties know their own secret keys.
Related Work: It was shown by Canetti, Lindell, Ostrovsky and Sahai [CLOS02] that secure computation is possible under general assumptions even when considering any corrupted number of parties in a concurrent setting (the UC framework). Their solution is, however, very far from being practical. For computation over Boolean circuits efficient solutions can be constructed from Yao's garbled circuit technique, see e.g. Pinkas, Schneider, Smart and Williams [PSSW09] . However, our main interest here is arithmetic computation over larger fields or rings, which is a much more efficient approach for applications such as benchmarking or some auction variants. A more efficient solution for the arithmetic case was shown by Cramer, Damgård and Nielsen [CDN01] , based on threshold homomorphic encryption. However, it requires distributed key generation and uses heavy public-key machinery throughout the protocol. More recently, Ishai, Prabhakaran and Sahai [IPS09] and the aforementioned DO protocol show more efficient solutions. Although the techniques used are completely different, the asymptotic complexities are similar, but the constants are significantly smaller in the DO solution, which was the most practical protocol proposed so far.
Notation:
We let U S denote the uniform distribution over the set S. We use x ← X to denote the process of sampling x from the distribution X or, if X is a set, a uniform choice from it.
We say that a function f : N → R is negligible if ∀c, ∃n c s.t. if n > n c then f (n) < n −c . We will use ε(·) to denote an unspecified negligible function.
For p ∈ N, we represent Z p by the numbers {− (p − 1)/2 , . . . , (p − 1)/2 }. If x is an m-dimensional vector, ||x|| ∞ := max(|x 1 |, . . . , |x m |). Unless differently specified, all the logarithms are in base 2.
As a general convention: lowercase letters a, b, c, . . . represent integers and capital letters A, B, C, . . . ciphertexts. Bold lowercase letters r, s, . . . are vectors and bold capitals M, A, . . . are matrices. We call κ the computational security parameter and u the statistical security parameter. In practice u can be set to be much smaller than κ, as it does not depend on the computing power of the adversary.
The Framework for Semi-Homomorphic Encryption
In this section we introduce a framework for public-key cryptosystems, that satisfy a relaxed version of the additive homomorphic property. Let PKE = (G, E, D) be a tuple of algorithms where: G(1 κ , p) is a randomized algorithm that takes as input a security parameter κ and a modulus p; 2 It outputs a public/secret key pair (pk, sk) and a set of parameters
is the description of a randomized algorithm producing as output d-vectors with integer entries (to be used as randomness for encryption). We require that except with negligible probability, D d σ will always output r with ||r|| ∞ ≤ σ, for some σ < R that may depend on κ. Finally, G is the abelian group where the ciphertexts belong (written in additive notation). For practical purposes one can think of M and R to be of size superpolynomial in κ, and p and σ as being much smaller than M and R respectively. We will assume that every other algorithm takes as input the parameters P, without specifying this explicitly.
E pk (x, r) is a deterministic algorithm that takes as input an integer x ∈ Z and a vector r ∈ Z d and outputs a ciphertext C ∈ G. We sometimes write E pk (x) when it is not important to specify the randomness explicitly. Given C 1 = E pk (x 1 , r 1 ), C 2 = E pk (x 2 , r 2 ) in G, we have C 1 + C 2 = E pk (x 1 + x 2 , r 1 + r 2 ). In other words, E pk (·, ·) is a homomorphism from (Z d+1 , +) to (G, +)). Given some τ and ρ we call C a (τ, ρ)-ciphertext if there exists x, r with |x| ≤ τ and ||r|| ∞ ≤ ρ such that C = E pk (x, r). Note that given a ciphertext τ and ρ are not unique. When we refer to a (τ, ρ)-ciphertext, τ and ρ should be interpreted as an upper limit to the size of the message and randomness contained in the ciphertext.
D sk (C) is a deterministic algorithm that takes as input a ciphertext C ∈ G and outputs x ∈ Z p ∪ {⊥}.
We say that a semi-homomorphic encryption scheme PKE is correct if, ∀p:
where the probabilities are taken over the random coins of G and E.
We now define the IND-CPA security game for a semi-homomorphic cryptosystem. Let A = (A 1 , A 2 ) be a PPT TM, then we run the following experiment:
We define the advantage of A as Adv
, where the probabilities are taken over the random choices of G, E, A in the above experiment. We say that PKE is IND-CPA secure if ∀ PPT A, Adv CPA (A, κ) < ε(κ). Next, we discuss the motivation for the way this framework is put together: when in the following, honest players encrypt data, plaintext x will be chosen in Z p and the randomness r according to D d σ . This ensures IND-CPA security and also that such data can be decrypted correctly, since by assumption on
However, we also want that a (possibly dishonest) player P i is committed to x by publishing C = E pk (x, r). We are not able to force a player to choose x in Z p , nor that r is sampled with the correct distribution. But our zero-knowledge protocols can ensure that C is a (τ, ρ)-ciphertext, for concrete values of τ, ρ. If τ < M, ρ < R, then correctness implies that C commits P i to x mod p, even if x, r may not be uniquely determined from C.
Examples of Semi-Homomorphic Encryption
Regev's cryptosystem [Reg05] is parametrized by p, q, m and α, and is given by (G, E, D). A variant of the system was also given in [BD10] , where parameters are chosen slightly differently than in the original. In both [Reg05] and [BD10] only a single bit was encrypted, it is quite easy, though, to extend it to elements of a bigger ring. It is this generalized version of the variant in [BD10] that we describe here. All calculations are done in Z q . Key generation G(1 κ ) is done by sampling s ∈ Z n q and A ∈ Z m×n q uniformly at random and x ∈ Z m q from a discrete Gaussian distribution with mean 0 and standard deviation qα √ 2π
. We then have the key pair (pk, sk) = ((A, As + x), s). Encryption of a message γ ∈ Z p is done by sampling a uniformly random vector
Regev's cryptosystem works with a decryption error, which can, however, be made negligibly small when choosing the parameters.
Fitting the cryptosystem to the framework is quite straight forward. The group G = Z n q × Z q and p is just the same. The distribution D d σ from which the randomness r is taken is the uniform distribution over {−1, 0, 1} m , that is d = m and σ = 1. Given two ciphertexts (a, b) and (a , b ) we define addition to be (a + a , b + b ). With this definition it follows quite easily that the homomorphic property holds. Due to the choices of message space and randomness distribution in Regev's cryptosystem, we will always have that the relation M = Rp/2 should hold. How M can be chosen, and thereby also R, depends on all the original parameters of the cryptosystem. First assume that q · α = d √ q with d > 1. Furthermore we will need that p ≤ q/(4 c √ q) for some constant c < d. Then to bound M we should have first that M < q/(4p) and secondly that M < p s √ q/(2m) for some s > cd/(d − c). Obtaining these bounds requires some tedious computation which we leave out here.
In Paillier's cryptosystem [Pai99] the secret key is two large primes p 1 , p 2 , the public key is N = p 1 p 2 , and the encryption function is E pk (x, r) = (N + 1) x r N mod N 2 where x ∈ Z N and r is random in Z * N 2 . The decryption function D sk reconstructs correctly any plaintext in Z N , and to get a semi-homomorphic scheme modulo p, we simply redefine the decryption as D(c) = D (c) mod p. It is not hard to see that we get a semi-homomorphic scheme with
, σ = ∞ and G = Z * N 2 . In particular, note that we do not need to bound the size of the randomness, hence we set σ = R = ∞.
The cryptosystem looks syntactically a bit different from our definition which writes G additively, while Z * N 2 is usually written with multiplicative notation; also for Paillier we have E pk (x, r) + E pk (x , r) = E pk (x + x , r · r ) and not E pk (x + x , r + r ). However, this makes no difference in the following, except that it actually makes some of the zero-knowledge protocols simpler (more details in Section 2.2). It is easy to see that the generalization of Paillier in [DJ01] can be modified in a similar way to be semi-homomorphic.
Subset Sum Cryptosystem Another example is (a slightly generalized version of) the cryptosystem from [LPS10] based on the subset sum problem.
In the subset sum problem with parameters n, q m (denoted SS(n, q m )), we are given a 1 , . . . , a n , T ∈ Z and want to find S ⊆ {1, . . . , n} such that i∈S a i = T mod q m . In the following we will use vector notation, that is for example we write a number in Z q m as an m-dimensional vector with entries in Z q . We use for the subset sum operation, so a subset sum with the elements in the columns of A ∈ Z m×n q is A s = As + c, where s ∈ {0, 1} n is the chosen subset of elements and c ∈ Z m q denotes the vector of carries in the sum. In our generalized version of the scheme, we will, however, also generalize the operator, such that the vector s is allowed to have non-binary entries.
The k-bit-cryptosystem based on SS(n,q n+k ) is given by (G , E , D ). Key generation G randomly samples A' ∈ Z n×n q and s 1 , . . . , s k ∈ {0, 1} n . Then, it calculates the subset sums:
k and randomness r ∈ {0, 1} n outputs r
, where v ∈ Z n q and w 1 , . . . , w k ∈ Z q and calculates
outputs as the i-th bit 0 if |y i | < q 4 and 1 otherwise. This will be correct with probability 1 − n −ω(1) . To make it fit into the framework we redefine the cryptosystem, allowing, first of all, multiples of elements in the subset sum and secondly we do encryptions of a single value in Z p instead of a vector of bits.
More precisely, we have a semi-homomorphic scheme modulo p where
The cryptosystem based on subset sum with parameters n and q n+1 is given by (G, E, D). Key generation G is done as in G', except that now s ∈ {−1, 0, 1} n . Encryption E pk (m, r) outputs r T A+ q/p [0 n ||m+m ], which is the same kind of expression as with normal encryption. The only difference is that the size of the entries in the random vector and the size of the message might exceed the "standard" values, σ and p for randomness and message respectively.
As for correctness the bounds M, R will need to be chosen such that they satisfy 2Rn + 2Rn log
due to tedious calculations omitted here. This also means that we will have to increase the size of q (and thereby the size of the ciphertext). Correctness is obtained as before with a decryption error of n −ω(1) . Semantic security follows in the same way as for the original scheme, assuming that the subset sum instance is hard. The problem SS(n, q m ) is known to be harder as the so called density n/ log(q m ) gets closer to 1 [IN96] . When the density is less than 1/n or larger than n/ log 2 (n) we have algorithms that use polynomial time, [LO85, Fri86, FP05, Lyu05, Sha08] . A concrete choice of q = Θ n log(n) will therefore still leave us in the range where the problem is assumed to be hard.
Other examples. The Okamoto-Uchiyama scheme is closely related to Paillier's cryptosystem, except that the modulus used is of the form p 2 1 p 2 . Just like the scheme of Damgård, Geisler and Krøigaard [DGK09] it is based on a subgroup-decision problem. Both schemes can be made semi-homomorphic modulo p in the same way as Paillier's scheme, by reducing modulo p after the normal decryption process is done.
The scheme by van Dijk, Gentry, Halevi and Vaikuntanathan [DGHV10] based on the approximate gcd problem is fully homomorphic, but if we only require the additive homomorphic property, much more practical instances of the cryptosystem can be built, and it is essentially by construction already semi-homomorphic.
Zero-Knowledge Proofs
We present two zero-knowledge protocols, Π PoPK , Π PoCM where a prover P proves to a verifier V that some ciphertexts are correctly computed and that some ciphertexts satisfy a multiplicative relation respectively. Π PoPK has (amortized) complexity O(κ + u) bits per instance proved, where the soundness error is 2 −u . Π PoCM has complexity O(κu). We also show a more efficient version of Π PoCM that works only for Paillier encryption, with complexity O(κ + u). Finally, in Appendix A, we define the multiplication security property that we conjecture is satisfied for all our example cryptosystems after applying a simple modification. We show that assuming this property, Π PoCM can be replaced by a different check that has complexity O(κ + u).
Π PoPK and Π PoCM will both be of the standard 3-move form with a random u-bit challenge, and so they are honest verifier zero-knowledge. To achieve zero-knowledge against an arbitrary verifier standard techniques can be used. In particular, in our MPC protocol we will assume -only for the sake of simplicity -a functionality F Rand that generates random challenges on demand. The F Rand functionality is specified in detail in Figure 10 and can be implemented in our key registration model using only semi-homomorphic encryption. In the protocols both prover and verifier will have public keys pk P and pk V . By E P (a, r) we denote an encryption under pk P , similarly for E V (a, r).
We emphasize that the zero-knowledge property of our protocols does not depend on IND-CPA security of the cryptosystem, instead it follows from the homomorphic property and the fact that the honest prover creates, for the purpose of the protocol, some auxiliary ciphertexts containing enough randomness to hide the prover's secrets.
Proof of Plaintext Knowledge. Π PoPK takes as common input u ciphertexts C k , k = 1, . . . , u. If these are (τ, ρ)-ciphertexts, the protocol is complete and statistical zero-knowledge. The protocol is sound in the following sense: assuming that pk P is well-formed, if P is corrupt and can make V accept with probability larger than 2 −u , then all the C k are (2 2u+log u τ, 2 2u+log u ρ)-ciphertexts. The protocol is also a proof of knowledge with knowledge error 2 −u that P knows correctly formed plaintexts and randomness for all the C k 's.
In other words, Π PoPK is a ZKPoK for the following relation, except that zero-knowledge and completeness only hold if the C k 's satisfy the stronger condition of being (τ, ρ)-ciphertexts. However, this is no problem in the following: the prover will always create the C k 's himself and can therefore ensure that they are correctly formed if he is honest.
We use the approach of [CD09] to get small amortized complexity of the zero-knowledge proofs, and thereby gaining efficiency by performing the proofs on u simultaneous instances. In the following we define m = 2u − 1, furthermore M e is an m × u matrix constructed given a uniformly random vector e = (e 1 , . . . , e u ) ∈ {0, 1} u . Specifically the (i, k)-th entry M e,i,k is given by M e,i,k = e i−k+1 for 1 ≤ i − k + 1 ≤ u and 0 otherwise. By M e,i we denote the i-th row of M e . The protocol can be seen in Figure 1 . Completeness and zero-knowledge follow by the following standard arguments.
Completeness This follows directly by construction. Assume that P is honest and look at the checks V makes. First
so this will obviously be correct if P is honest. Furthermore z i = y i + M e,i · x, and since the entries in c are (τ, ρ)-ciphertexts, we have that M e,i · x ≤ uτ . This means that M e,i · x is taken from an exponentially smaller interval than y i , and therefore the check of |z i | ≤ 2 u−1+log u τ will only fail with negligible probability. A similar argument can be made for the check of ||t i || ∞ ≤ 2 u−1+log u ρ.
Zero-Knowledge
We give an honest-verifier simulator for the protocol that simulates accepting conversations. First note that a conversation has the form (a, e, (z, T)). Now, to simulate an accepting conversation first choose e ∈ {0, 1} u uniformly random, and z, T uniformly random such that d contains
where as always
. A simulated accepting conversation is now given by (a, e, (z, T)).
We should now argue that a real accepting conversation and a simulated accepting conversation are statistically indistinguishable. By construction it will clearly still be the case that d = a + M e · c. Now we look at the distributions of the conversations. First the distribution of e in both real and simulated conversations is exactly the same. Looking at a in a real conversation the entries A k will be uniformly random (2 u−1+log u τ, 2 u−1+log u ρ)-ciphertexts. In the simulated conversation we have
Looking at M e · c and remembering that M e only contains entries in {0, 1}, we see that M e · c will be a vector containing at most (uτ, uρ)-ciphertexts. What we conclude is that the contribution from M e · c is exponentially smaller than the contribution from d, so a = d − M e · c will be statistically indistinguishable from uniformly random (2 u−1+log u τ, 2 u−1+log u ρ)-ciphertexts. A similar argument can be made for the statistical indistinguishability of (z, T) in the two cases.
Here we argue soundness which is the more interesting case:
Soundness Assume we are given any prover P * , and consider the case where P * can make V accept for both e and e , e = e , by sending z, z , T and T respectively. We now have the following equation:
What we would like is to find x = (x 1 , . . . , x u ) and R = (r 1 , . . . , r u ) such that C k = E P (x k , r k ). We can do this by viewing (2) as a system of linear equations. First let j be the biggest index such that e j = e j . Now look at the u × u submatrix of M e − M e' given by the rows j through j + u both included. This is an upper triangular matrix with entries in {−1, 0, 1} and e j − e j = 0 on a diagonal. Now remember the form of the entries in the vectors c, d and d , we have
We can now directly solve the equations for the x k 's and the r k 's by starting with C u and going up. We give examples of the first few equations (remember we are going bottom up). For simplicity we will assume that all entries in M e − M e will be 1.
Since we know all values used on the right hand sides and since the cryptosystem used is additively homomorphic, it should now be clear that we can find x k and r k such that C k = E P (x k , r k ). A final note should be said about what we can guarantee about the sizes of x k and r k . Knowing that
Thus this is what we can guarantee.
Subprotocol ΠPoPK: Proof of Plaintext Knowledge
PoPK(u, τ, ρ):
. We define the vectors c = (C1, . . . , Cu) and x = (x1, . . . , xu) and the matrix R = (r1, . . . , ru), where the r k 's are rows.
, and sends them to V . We define vectors a and y and matrix S as above. 3. V chooses a uniformly random vector e = (e1, . . . , eu) ∈ {0, 1} u , and sends it to P . 4. Finally P computes and sends z = y + Me · x and T = S + Me · R to V . 5. V checks that d = a + Me · c where d = (EP (z1, t1) , . . . , EP (zm, tm)). Furthermore, V checks that |zi| ≤ 2 u−1+log u τ and ||ti||∞ ≤ 2 u−1+log u ρ. 
Subprotocol ΠPoCM: Proof of Correct Multiplication
PoCM(u, τ, ρ):
, where
3. V chooses u uniformly random bits e k and sends them to P .
Step 2-5 is repeated in parallel u times. Proof of Correct Multiplication. Π PoCM (u, τ, ρ) takes as common input u triples of ciphertexts (A k , B k , C k ) for k = 1, . . . , u, where A k is under pk P and B k and C k are under pk V (and so are in the group G V ). If P is honest, he will know a k and a k ≤ τ . Furthermore P has created
Under these assumptions the protocol is zero-knowledge.
Jumping ahead, we note that in the context where the protocol will be used, it will always be known that B k in every triple is a (2 2u+log u τ, 2 2u+log u ρ)-ciphertext, as a result of executing Π PoPK . The choice of sizes for E V (r k , t k ) then ensures that C k is statistically close to a random (2 3u+log u τ 2 , 2 3u+log u τ ρ)-ciphertext, and so reveals no information on a k to V . Summarizing, Π PoCM is a ZKPoK for the relation (under the assumption that pk P , pk V are well-formed):
The protocol can be seen in Figure 2 . Note that Step 6 could also be interpreted as choosing e k as a u-bit vector instead, thereby only calling F Rand once.
Completeness In the following we leave out the subscript k; for instance a means a k . Completeness follows directly by construction. Consider the first two checks that V makes in step 5 of the protocol. First we have:
Secondly we have:
For V 's checks on sizes these will succeed except with negligible probability since the intervals from which d, s, f and y are taken are exponentially larger than those from which a, h, r and t are taken.
Soundness Again we leave out the subscript k. Assume we are given any prover P * , and consider the case where P * can make V accept for both e = 0 and e = 1 by sending (z 0 , v 0 , x 0 , w 0 ) and (z 1 , v 1 , x 1 , w 1 ) respectively. This gives us the following equations:
which gives us that,
This shows that a cheating prover P * has success probability at most 1/2 in one iteration. Since we repeat u times, this gives a soundness error of 2 −u . A final note should be said about what we can guarantee about the sizes of a k , h k , r k and t k . Knowing that
Zero-Knowledge Again we leave out the subscript k. We give an honest-verifier simulator for the protocol that simulates accepting conversations. First note that a conversation has the form ((D, F ), e, (z, v, x, w)). Now to simulate an accepting conversation we first choose e as a uniformly random bit, and (z, v, x, w) uniformly random such that |z| ≤ 2 3u−1+log u τ , ||v|| ∞ ≤ 2 3u−1+log u ρ, |x| ≤ 2 4u−1+log u τ 2 and ||w|| ∞ ≤ 2 4u−1+log u τ ρ. Finally construct D and F such that D + eA = E P (z, v) and F + eC = zB + E V (x, w). A simulated accepting conversation is now given by ((D, F ), e, (z, v, x, w)).
We now argue that a real accepting conversation is statistically indistinguishable from a simulated accepting conversation. By construction it will clearly be the case that D + eA = E P (z, v) and F + eC = zB + E V (x, w), which is what V checks. Next we look at the distributions of the conversations. First the distribution of e is clearly the same in both cases. Looking at D in a real conversation, this is uniformly random (2 3u−1+log u τ, 2 3u−1+log u ρ)-ciphertext, in the simulated case it is given by
For Π PoCM we sketch a version that is more efficient than the above, using special properties of Paillier encryption. In order to improve readability, we depart here from the additive notation for operations on ciphertexts, since multiplicative notation is usually used for Paillier. In the following, let pk V = N . Note first that based on such a public key, one can define an unconditionally hiding commitment scheme with public key g = E V (0). To commit to a ∈ Z N , one sends com(a, r) = g a r N mod N , for random r ∈ Z * N 2 . One can show that the scheme is binding assuming it is hard to extract N -th roots modulo N 2 (which must be the case if Paillier encryption is secure).
We restate the relation R (u,τ,ρ)
PoCM from above as it will look for the Paillier case, in multiplicative notation and without bounds on the randomness:
Subprotocol ΠPoCM: Proof of Correct Multiplication (only for Paillier)
. . , u to the verifier. 2. P uses ΠPoPK on Φ k to prove that, even if P is corrupted, each Φ k contains a value r k with |r k | ≤ 2 5u+2 log u τ 2 . 3. P uses ΠPoPK in parallel on (A k , Ψ k ) (where V uses the same e in both runs) to prove that, even if P is corrupted, Ψ k and A k contains the same value a k and |a k | ≤ 2 2u+log u τ . 4. To show that the C k 's are well-formed, we do the following for each k:
(a) P picks random x, y, v, γ, δ ← Z * N 2 and sends
He also computes qa, qr, where x + ea = qaN + za, y + er k = qrN + zr.
a P sends za, zr, w = vs
a Since g and B k do not have order N , we need to explicitly handle the quotients qa and qr, in order to move the "excess multiples" of N into the randomness parts of the commitments and ciphertext. The idea for the proof of knowledge for this relation is now to ask the prover to also send commitments
. . u to the r k 's and a k 's. Now, the prover must first provide a proof of knowledge that for each k: 1) the same bounded size value is contained in both A k and Ψ k , and that 2) a bounded size value is contained in Φ k . The proof for {Φ k } is simply Π PoPK since a commitment has the same form as an encryption (with (N + 1) replaced by g). The proof for {Ψ k , A k } is made of two instances of Π PoPK run in parallel, using the same challenge e and responses z i in both instances. Finally, the prover must show that C k can be written as
, where a k is the value contained in Ψ k and r k is the value in Φ k . Since all commitments and ciphertexts live in the same group Z * N 2 , where pk V = N , we can do this efficiently using a variant of a protocol from [CDN01] . The resulting protocol is shown in Figure 3 .
Completeness of the protocol in steps 1-4 of Figure 3 is straightforward by inspection. Honest verifier zero-knowledge follows by the standard argument: choose e and the prover's responses uniformly in their respective domains and use the equations checked by the verifier to compute a matching first message D, X, Y . This implies completeness and honest verifier zero-knowledge for the overall protocol, since the subprotocols in steps 2 and 3 have these properties as well.
Finally, soundness follows by assuming we are given correct responses in step 7 to two different challenges. From the equations checked by the verifier, we can then easily compute s k ) . Now, by soundness of the protocols in steps 2 and 3, we can also compute bounded size values a k , r k that are contained in Ψ k , Φ k . By the binding property of the commitment scheme, we have r k = r k , a k = a k except with negligible probability, so we have a witness as required in the specification of the relation.
The Online Phase
Our goal is to implement reactive arithmetic multiparty computation over Z p for a prime p of size superpolynomial in the statistical security parameter u. The (standard) ideal functionality F AMPC that we implement can be seen in Figure 6 . We assume here that the parties already have a functionality for synchronous 3 , secure communication and broadcast.
We first present a protocol for an online phase that assumes access to a functionality F TRIP which we later show how to implement using an offline protocol. The online phase is based on a representation of values in Z p that are shared additively where shares are authenticated using information theoretic message authentication codes (MACs). Before presenting the protocol we introduce how the MACs work and how they are included in the representation of a value in Z p . Furthermore, we argue how one can compute with these representations as we do with simple values, and in particular how the relation to the MACs are maintained.
In the rest of this section, all additions and multiplications are to be read modulo p, even if not specified. The number of parties is denoted by n, and we call the parties P 1 , . . . , P n .
The MACs
A key K in this system is a random pair K = (α, β) ∈ Z 2 p , and the authentication code for a value a ∈ Z p is MAC K (a) = αa + β mod p.
We will apply the MACs by having one party P i hold a, MAC K (a) and another party P j holding K. The idea is to use the MAC to prevent P i from lying about a when he is supposed to reveal it to P j . It will be very important in the following that if we keep α constant over several different MAC keys, then one can add two MACs and get a valid authentication code for the sum of the two corresponding messages. More concretely, two keys K = (α, β), K = (α , β ) are said to be consistent if α = α . For consistent keys, we define K + K = (α, β + β ) so that it holds that MAC K (a) + MAC K (a ) = MAC K+K (a + a ).
The MACs will be used as follows: we give to P i several different values m 1 , m 2 , . . . with corresponding MACs γ 1 , γ 2 , . . . computed using keys K i = (α, β i ) that are random but consistent. It is then easy to see that if P i claims a false value for any of the m i 's (or a linear combination of them) he can guess an acceptable MAC for such a value with probability at most 1/p.
Opening:
We can reliably open a consistent representation to Pj: each Pi sends ai, mj(ai) to Pj. Pj checks that mj(ai) = MAC K j a i
(ai) and broadcasts OK or fail accordingly. If all is OK, Pj computes a = i ai, else we abort. We can modify this to opening a value [a] to all parties, by opening as above to every Pj. Addition: Given two key-consistent representations as above we get that
is a consistent representation of a + a . This new representation can be computed only by local operations. Multiplication by constants: In a similar way, we can multiply a public constant δ "into" a representation. This is written δ[a] and is taken to mean that all parties multiply their shares, keys and MACs by δ. This gives a consistent representation [δa]. Addition of constants: We can add a public constant δ into a representation. This is written δ + [a] and is taken to mean that P1 will add δ to his share a1. Also, each Pj will replace his key K 1. It waits to get from the environment either "stop", or some data as specified below. In the first case it sends "fail" to all honest parties and stops. In the second case, the environment specifies for each corrupt party Pi, a share ai and n pairs of values (mj(ai), β i a j ), j = 1, . . . , n, except those (mj(ai), β i a j ) where both Pi and Pj are corrupt. 2. The functionality chooses a ∈ Zp at random and creates the representation [a] as follows:
(a) First it chooses random shares for the honest parties such that the sum of these and those specified by the environment is correct: Let C be the set of corrupt parties, then ai is chosen at random for Pi ∈ C, subject to a = i ai. (d) Now all data for [a] is created. The functionality sends {ai, {K i a j , mj(ai)}j=1,...,n} to each honest Pi (no need to send anything to corrupt parties, the environment already has the data). Triples: On input (triples, u) from all parties Pi, the functionality does the following, for v = 1, . . . , u:
1.
Step 1 is done as in "Singles". 
The Representation and Linear Computation
To represent a value a ∈ Z p , we will give a share a i to each party P i . In addition, P i will hold MAC keys K i a1 , . . . , K i an . He will use key K i aj to check the share of P j , if we decide to make a public. Finally, P i also holds a set of authentication codes MAC K j a i (a i ). We will denote MAC K j a i (a i ) by m j (a i ) from now on. Party P i will use m j (a i ) to convince P j that a i is correct, if we decide to make a public. Summing up, we have the following way of representing a:
where
} is the information held privately by P i , and where we use [a] as shorthand when it is not needed to explicitly talk about the shares and MACs. We say that [ 
are said to be key-consistent if they are both consistent, and if for all i, j the keys K i aj , K i a j are consistent. We will want all representations in the following to be key-consistent: this is ensured by letting P i use the same α j -value in keys towards P j throughout. Therefore the notation K 
Functionality FAMPC
Initialize: On input (init, p) from all parties, the functionality activates and stores the modulus p. Rand: On input (rand , Pi, varid ) from all parties Pi, with varid a fresh identifier, the functionality picks r ← Zp and stores (varid , r). Input: On input (input, Pi, varid , x) from Pi and (input, Pi, varid , ?) from all other parties, with varid a fresh identifier, the functionality stores (varid , x). Add: On command (add , varid 1, varid 2, varid 3) from all parties (if varid 1, varid 2 are present in memory and varid 3 is not), the functionality retrieves (varid 1, x), (varid 2, y) and stores (varid 3, x + y mod p). Multiply: On input (multiply, varid 1, varid 2, varid 3) from all parties (if varid 1, varid 2 are present in memory and varid 3 is not), the functionality retrieves (varid 1, x), (varid 2, y) and stores (varid 3, x · y mod p). Output: On input (output, Pi, varid ) from all parties (if varid is present in memory), the functionality retrieves (varid , x) and outputs it to Pi. 
Triples and Multiplication

For multiplication and input sharing we will need both random single values [a] and triples [a], [b], [c] where
a, b are random and c = ab mod p. Also, we assume that all singles and triples we ever produce are key consistent, so that we can freely add them together. More precisely, we assume we have access to an ideal functionality F TRIP providing us with the above. This is presented in Figure 5 . The principle in the specification of the functionality is that the environment is allowed to specify all the data that the corrupted parties should hold, including all shares of secrets, keys and MACs. Then, the functionality chooses the secrets to be shared and constructs the data for honest parties so it is consistent with the secrets and the data specified by the environment.
Thanks to this functionality we are also able to compute multiplications in the following way: If the parties hold two key-consistent representations [ Using the tools from the previous sections we can now construct a protocol Π AMPC that securely implements the MPC functionality F AMPC in the UC security framework. F AMPC and Π AMPC are presented in Figure 6 and Figure 7 respectively. Theorem 1. In the F TRIP -hybrid model, the protocol Π AMPC implements F AMPC with statistical security against any static 4 , active adversary corrupting up to n − 1 parties.
Proof. We construct a simulator S AMPC such that a poly-time environment Z cannot distinguish between the real protocol system F TRIP composed with Π AMPC and F AMPC composed with S AMPC . We assume here static, active corruption. The simulator will internally run a copy of F TRIP composed with Π AMPC where it corrupts the parties specified by Z. The simulator relays messages between parties/F TRIP and Z, such that Z will see the same interface as when interacting with a real protocol. During the run of the internal protocol the simulator will keep copies of the shares, MACs and keys of both honest and corrupted parties and update them according to the execution. The idea is now, that the simulator runs the protocol with the environment, where it plays the role of the honest parties. Since the inputs of the honest parties are not known to the simulator these will be random values (or zero). However, if the protocol is secure, the environment will not be able to tell the difference. The specification of the simulator S AMPC is presented in Figure 8 .
In general, the openings in the protocol do not reveal any information about the values that the parties have. Whenever we open a value during Input or Multiply we mask it by subtracting with a new random value. Therefore, the distribution of the view of the corrupted parties is exactly the same in the simulation as in the real case. Then, the only method there is left for the environment to distinguish between the two cases, is to compare the protocol execution with the inputs and outputs of the honest parties and check for inconsistency.
If the simulated protocol fails at some point because of a wrong MAC, the simulator aborts which is consistent with the internal state of the ideal functionality since, in this case, the simulator also makes the ideal functionality fail.
Simulator SAMPC In the following, H and C represent the set of corrupted and and honest parties, respectively.
Initialize:
The simulator initializes the copy with p and creates the desired number of triples. Here the simulator will read all data of the corrupted parties specified to the copy of FTRIP. Rand: The simulator runs the copy protocol honestly and calls rand on the ideal functionality FAMPC. Input: If Pi ∈ H the copy is run honestly with dummy input, for example 0. If in Step 1 during input, the MACs are not correct, the protocol is aborted.
If Pi ∈ C the input step is done honestly and then the simulator waits for Pi to broadcast δ. Given this, the simulator can compute x i = a + δ mod p since it knows (all the shares of) a. This is the supposed input of Pi, which the simulator now gives to the ideal functionality FAMPC. Add: The simulator runs the protocol honestly and calls add on the ideal functionality FAMPC. Multiply: The simulator runs the protocol honestly and, as before, aborts if some share from a corrupted party is not correct. Otherwise it calls multiply on the ideal functionality FAMPC. Output: If Pi ∈ H the output step is run and the protocol is aborted if some share from a corrupted party is not correct. Otherwise the simulator calls output on FAMPC.
If Pi ∈ C the simulator calls output on FAMPC. Since Pi is corrupted the ideal functionality will provide the simulator with y, which is the output to Pi. Now it has to simulate shares yj of honest parties such that they are consistent with y. This is done by changing one of the internal shares of an honest party. Let P k be that party. The new share is now computed as y k = y − i =k yi. Next, a valid MAC for y k is needed. This, the simulator can compute from scratch as MAC K i y k (y k ) since it knows from the beginning the keys of Pi.
This enables it to compute K i y k by the computations on representations done during the protocol. Now the simulator sends the internal shares and corresponding MACs to Pi. If the simulated protocol succeeds, the ideal functionality is always told to output the result of the function evaluation. This result is of course the correct evaluation of the input matching the shares that were read from the corrupted parties in the beginning. Therefore, if the corrupted parties during the protocol successfully cheat with their shares, this would not be consistent. However, as argued in Section 3.1, the probability of a party being able to claim a wrong value for a given MAC is 1/p. In conclusion, if the protocol succeeds, the computation is correct except with probability a polynomial multiple (the number of MACs ever checked) of 1/p.
The Offline Phase
In this section we describe the protocol Π TRIP which securely implements the functionality F TRIP described in Section 3 in the presence of two standard functionalities: a key registration functionality F KeyReg (Figure 9 ) and a functionality that generates random challenges F Rand (Figure 10) 5 .
Functionality FKeyReg
FKeyReg proceeds as follows, given G and security parameter 1 κ :
Registration (honest): On input p from an honest party Pi, the functionality runs (ski, pki) ← G(1 κ , p), and then sends (registered , Pi, pki, ⊥) to all parties Pj = Pi and (registered , Pi, pki, ski) to Pi; Registration (corrupted): On input (p, r * ) from a corrupted party Pi, the functionality does as before using r * (instead of a uniform string) as the random tape for the G algorithm. Fig. 9 . The ideal functionality for the key registration model.
5 FRand is only introduced for the sake of a cleaner presentation, and it could easily be implemented in the FKeyReg model using semi-homomorphic encryption only.
Functionality FRand
Rand. sample: The functionality has only one command: When receiving (rand , u) from all parties, it samples a uniform r ← {0, 1} u and outputs (rand , r) to all parties. 
· -representation
Throughout the description of the offline phase, E i will denote E pki where pk i is the public key of party P i , as established by F KeyReg . We assume the cryptosystem used is semi-homomorphic modulo p, as defined in Section 2. In the following, we will always set τ = p/2 and ρ = σ. Thus, if P i generates a ciphertext C = E i (x, r) where x ∈ Z p and r is generated by D d σ , C will be a (τ, ρ)-ciphertext. We will use the zeroknowledge protocols from Section 2.2. They depend on an "information theoretic" security parameter u controlling, e.g., the soundness error. We will say that a semi-homomorphic cryptosystem is admissible if it allows correct decryption of ciphertext produced in those protocols, that is, if M ≥ 2 5u+2 log u τ 2 and R ≥ 2 4u+log u τ ρ.
In the following x k will stand for the following representation of x k ∈ Z p : each P i has published E i (x k,i ) and holds x k,i privately, such that x k = i x k,i mod p. For the protocol to be secure, it will be necessary to ensure that the parties encrypt small enough plaintexts. For this purpose we use the Π PoPK described in Section 2.2, and we get the protocol in Figure 11 to establish a set x k , k = 1, . . . , u of such random representations.
Subprotocol ΠSHARE
Share(u):
1. Each Pi chooses x k,i ∈ Zp at random for k = 1, . . . , u and broadcasts (τ, ρ)-ciphertexts {Ei(x k,i )} u k=1 . 2. Each pair Pi, Pj, i = j, runs ΠPoPK(u, τ, ρ) with the Ei(x k,i )'s as input. This proves that the ciphertexts are (2 2u+log u τ, 2 2u+log u ρ)-ciphertexts. 3. All parties output x k = (E1(x k,1 ) , . . . , En(x k,n )), for k = 1, . . . , u, where x k is defined by x k = i x k,i mod p. Pi keeps the x k,i and the randomness for his encryptions as private output. Fig. 11 . Subprotocol allowing parties to create random additively shared values.
Subprotocol Π2-MULT 2-Mult(u, τ, ρ):
. (At this point of the protocol it has already been verified that the ciphertexts are (2 2u+log u τ, 2 2u+log u ρ)-ciphertexts.) 2. For each k, Pi sends C k = x k Ej(y k ) + Ej(r k ) to Pj. Here Ej(r k ) is a random (2 3u+log u τ 2 , 2 3u+log u τ ρ)-encryption under Pj's public key. Pi furthermore invokes ΠPoCM(u, τ, ρ) with input C k , Ei(x k ), Ej(y k ), to prove that the C k 's are constructed correctly. 3. For each k, Pj decrypts C k to obtain v k , and outputs z k,j = v k mod p. Pi outputs z k,i = −r k mod p. 1. The input is a k , b k , k = 1, . . . , u, created using the ΠSHARE protocol. Each Pi initializes variables c k,i = a k,i b k,i mod p, k = 1, . . . , u. 2. Each pair Pi, Pj, i = j, runs Π2-MULT using as input the ciphertexts Ei(a k,i ), Ej(b k,j ), k = 1, . . . , u, and adds the outputs to the private variables c k,i , c k,j , i.e., for k = 1, . . . , u, Pi sets c k,i = c k,i + z k,i mod p, and Pj sets c k,j = c k,j + z k,i mod p. 3. Each Pi invokes ΠSHARE, where c k,i , k = 1, . . . , u is used as the numbers to broadcast encryptions of.
Parties output what ΠSHARE outputs, namely c k , k = 1, . . . , u. 
, the parties invoke ΠSHARE 4 times.
The parties invoke Πn-MULT twice, on inputs
. 3. The parties invoke ΠADDMACS on each of the created sets of the representations. That means they now have
. 4. The parties check that indeed a k b k = c k mod p by "sacrificing" the triples (f k , g k , h k ): First, the parties invoke FRand to get a random u-bit challenge e. Then, they open e[
1. To get a set of representations { a } u k=1 , ΠSHARE is invoked. 2. The parties invoke ΠADDMACS on the created set of representations and obtain {[a k ]} u k=1 . Fig. 15 . The protocol for the offline phase.
· -multiplication
The final goal of the Π TRIP protocol is to produce triples
representation, but for now we will disregard the MACs and construct a protocol Π n-MULT which produces triples a k , b k , c k in the · -representation.
k, we want the protocol to output z k,i , z k,j to P i , P j , respectively, such that x k y k = z k,i + z k,j mod p. Such a protocol can be seen in Figure 12 . This protocol does not commit parties to their output, so there is no guarantee that corrupt parties will later use their output correctly -however, the protocol ensures that malicious parties know which shares they ought to continue with. To build the protocol Π n-MULT , the first thing to notice is that given a k and b k we have that c k = a k b k = i j a k,i b k,j . Constructing each of the terms in this sum in shared form is exactly what Π 2-MULT allows us to do. The Π n-MULT protocol can now be seen in Figure 13 . Note that it does not guarantee that the multiplicative relation in the triples holds, we will check for this later.
From · -triples to [·]-triples
We first describe a protocol that allows us to add MACs to the · -representation. This consists essentially of invoking the Π 2-MULT a number of times. The protocol is shown in Figure 14 . The full protocol Π TRIP , which also includes the possibility of creating a set of single values, is now a straightforward application of the subprotocols we have defined now. This is shown in Figure 15 .
Theorem 2. If the underlying cryptosystem is semi-homomorphic modulo p, admissible and IND-CPA secure, then Π TRIP implements F TRIP with computational security against any static, active adversary corrupting up to n − 1 parties, in the (F KeyReg , F Rand )-hybrid model.
Proof. We first observe that any semi-homomorphic encryption scheme has, in addition to the regular key generation algorithm G, the following alternate key generation algorithm G * :
is a randomized algorithm that outputs a meaningless public key pk with the property that an encryption of any message E pk (x) is statistically indistinguishable from an encryption of 0. Let (pk, sk) ← G(1 κ , p) and pk ← G * (1 κ , p). Then we have that pk and pk are computationally indistinguishable.
Most of our example schemes already have this property, where in fact indistinguishability of the two types of keys is equivalent to semantic security. However, the property can be assumed without loss of generality, by including a ciphertext C e = E pk (b) in the public key redefining the encryption algorithm to be E * pk (x) = x · C e + E pk (0). Then, both G and G * would run the same algorithm, with the only difference being that G uses b = 1 while G * uses b = 0. Also in this case, semantic security is equivalent to indistinguishability of the types of keys. Additionally, the presence of meaningless public keys allows us to use semi-homomorphic encryption to construct UC-commitments, using techniques similar to [DN02] .
The Simulator S TRIP We now construct a simulator S TRIP where the idea is that it simulates the calls to F KeyReg and F Rand and runs a copy of the protocol internally. The simulator plays the honest players' role and does all the steps in Π TRIP . During these, it obtains the shares and values of the corrupted parties, since it knows all the secret keys. These values are then input to F TRIP . A precise description is provided in Figure 16 .
Security is argued by doing the following reduction: Assume there exists a distinguisher D that can distinguish with significant probability between a real and a simulated view. Then, we can use this to distinguish between a normally generated public key and the so-called meaningless public key described above. That is, we can construct a distinguisher D that given a public key pk * can tell whether pk * = pk or pk * = pk. This is a contradiction since a key generated by the normal key generator is computationally indistinguishable from a meaningless key.
We do the above by constructing an algorithm B that takes as input a public key pk * which is either a normal public key or a meaningless public key. The output of B is a view, view * of the same form as what the environment would see. If pk * = pk, the view will correspond to either a real protocol run or to a simulated run. If, however, pk * = pk the view is such that a real run is statistically indistinguishable from a simulated. Then, we give view * to D, which guesses either real or sim. If D guesses correctly, we guess that pk * = pk otherwise we guess pk * = pk.
Simulator STRIP
Initialize:
The simulator first uses G(1 κ ) to generate the key pairs (ski, pki) for every Pi and sends the keys to the corrupt parties. Then, it does the initialization step of ΠTRIP where it aborts if ΠPoPK fails for some Pi, Pj, where either Pi or Pj is honest. Otherwise, for each pair Pi, Pj where Pi is corrupt and Pj is honest, the simulator will receive Ei(α i j ), which it decrypts and inputs to FTRIP when calling Initialize. Triples: The simulator performs ΠTRIP. During this, ΠPoPK and ΠPoCM are performed a number of times. The simulator will abort the protocol if they fail for some Pi, Pj, where either Pi or Pj is honest. Otherwise it proceeds with the steps: 1. In the first step ΠSHARE is invoked 4 times, in which the simulator receives for each corrupt Pi ciphertexts
The simulator decrypts and stores these. 2. Next, in step 2, during the sharing, the simulator receives from each corrupt Pi ciphertexts
Again, the simulator decrypts and stores. 3. Then, in step 3, the protocol Π2-MULT is done between two parties Pi, Pj to obtain keys and MACs for all the shares. In the case where Pi is corrupt and Pj is honest the simulator obtains the MAC, for say a k,j by decrypting the d k sent by Pi. When, on the other hand, Pi is honest and Pj is corrupt, the simulator decrypts d k , getting s k , about which ΠPoCM guarantees s k = y k x k + r k mod p. Therefore, the simulator obtains β i a k,j by calculating −(s k − x k y k ) mod p. This can be done since y k is chosen by Pi, that is here the simulator, and x k is acquired earlier during input sharing. 4. Finally, in step 4, FRand is simulated by choosing a random u-bit value. Then, the check is done honestly.
If the check fails, the simulator aborts. Otherwise, the simulator calls Triples on FTRIP and inputs all the shares and values of the corrupted parties. Singles: The simulator does step 1 and 3 from above, but only with one set of representations. Then it calls
Singles on FTRIP where it inputs the shares and values of corrupted parties. For simplicity we describe in the following, the algorithm B for the two-party setting, where we have a corrupt party P 1 and an honest party P 2 : We start by letting the input pk * be the public key of P 2 and then we generate a normal key pair (pk 1 , sk 1 ) and send it to P 1 . After this, we begin executing the protocol. However, during multiplications when P 1 sends ciphertexts to P 2 , we cannot decrypt. Instead, we exploit that P 1 and P 2 have run Π PoCM with P 1 as prover. That is P 1 has proved that he knows a, r of appropriate size such that the ciphertext was constructed as aE pk2 (x) + E pk2 (r). This means, we can use the knowledge extractor of Π PoCM and rewinding to extract the values a, r from P 1 . With this we calculate the resulting plaintext y = ax + r mod p, and continue the protocol as if we had decrypted. In the end we choose randomly between the real or the simulated view. In the first case, we let the output be exactly those values, that were used in our execution of the protocol. That is, all shared values are determined from the values that were used, so for example a = a Real P1 + a Real P2 . In the second case, we choose the output for P 2 as F TRIP would do. That means, the shares of a given triple a P1 , b P1 , c P1 will now be determined by choosing a, b at random, setting c = ab mod p and then letting a P2 = a − a
It can now be seen, that if pk * was a normal key, then the view corresponds statistically to either a real or a simulated execution. The execution matches exactly either a real or a simulated one except from the small probability that an extractor fails in getting the value inside an encryption, in which case we give up.
If pk * is a meaningless key, we know first of all that the encryptions under P 2 's key contain statistically no information about the values. Then, because of Π PoPK , it is guaranteed that the parties make well-formed ciphertexts, encrypting values that are not too big. This and the fact that the cryptosystem is admissible ensures, that decryption gives the correct value when B or the simulator decrypts. Moreover, bounding the size is very important in Π 2-MULT , when P 2 sends a k E 1 (b k ) + E 1 (r k ), such that we are certain that the random value r k is big enough to mask P 2 's choice a k . In addition, we need that all messages sent in the zero-knowledge protocols where P 2 acts as prover, do not depend on the specific values that P 2 has. This is indeed the case, since the zero-knowledge property implies that the conversations could just as well have been simulated without knowing what is inside the encryptions. 
since these are just random values. Moreover, it is easy to see that if the triples are correct, this check will be true. On the other hand, if they are not correct, the probability of satisfying the check is 2 −u , since there is only one random challenge e, for which e(c k − a k b k ) = (h k − g k f k ). Therefore, if the check goes through we know that the multiplicative relation between a k , b k , c k holds except with very small probability.
As a result, if we use a meaningless key, a real execution and a simulated execution are statistically indistinguishable. Therefore, if D can distinguish real views from simulated views with some advantage ε, then D can distinguish normal keys from meaningless keys with advantage ε − δ. We subtract δ, since there is some negligible error that B does not succeed, for instance because of the knowledge extractor or if the adversary is able to cheat with the check of the triples. However, if ε is non-negligible, then ε − δ is also non-negligible, and so we have our contradiction.
A The Multiplication Security Property
Let (G, E, D) be a semi-homomorphic cryptosystem. Consider the following game, played between the adversary A and challenger B.
1. B generates a key pair G(1 κ , p) = (sk, pk). He chooses y, s ∈ R Z p and r according to D d σ . He flips a coin and sets z to be y or s accordingly. Finally, he sends Y = E pk (y, r) to A. 2. A outputs integer x and ciphertext C. Here, x must be small enough that xy will not exceed the bound for correct decryption. 3. B checks if xy mod p = D sk (C), and sends either "no" or "yes" to A. In the latter case, he also sends z to A. 4. A outputs a bit, which we think of as his guess at whether B chose z = y or s. A wins if his guess is correct.
We say the cryptosystem is multiplication-secure if no polynomial-time adversary wins with probability more than 1/2 + ε(κ) where ε(κ) is negligible. This game is meant to model Π 2-MULT where A (called P i there) is supposed to multiply a number a into an encryption X to get C. If we do not require him to prove in zero-knowledge that he did that correctly, but instead check after the fact whether C contains the right thing, A gets this one bit of information. Multiplication security says that even given this bit, whatever is inside Y still seems completely random to A.
Note that A has no chance to win when B says "no". This corresponds to the fact that the real protocol is aborted if the test says C is bad, and nothing at all is revealed later.
Multiplication security implies semantic security (for a different cryptosystem, where you encrypt m by sending E pk (x), m ⊕ x), but it is not clear whether it is strictly stronger in general.
Our semi-homomorphic schemes are not all multiplication secure. Consider our Paillier variant, for instance: Given the encryption Y = E pk (y), the adversary could choose a = 1 and compute C = E pk (y + b) for some b of his choice, using the homomorphic property. If he chooses b to be a multiple of p that is close to (N − 1)/2, then on the one hand ay = a(y + b) mod p. On the other hand, if y < 0 the addition of b to y will not create overflow modulo N , while y ≥ 0 we will get overflow most of the time and the multiplicative relation mod p no longer holds. Hence, if A sends such a C to B and gets answer "yes" along with z, he clearly has a significant advantage: If z ≤ 0 he will guess that z = y, else he will guess that z = s.
We therefore suggest to modify the encryption algorithm from E toĒ, wherē
where v is random. We can set the parameters so that v can take superpolynomially many values, and still we can decrypt correctly. Note that relations modulo p that we care about will not be affected by this change. With this modification, the above attack on Paillier fails: by semantic security of Paillier, the choice of b cannot be significantly correlated to the choice of v. Given this, it is easy to see that the distributions of B's answers for any y will be statistically close to each other. This modification can be applied to any semi-homomorphic cryptosystem, and we conjecture that with this change, all our examples are indeed multiplication secure. The basis for this is that all the example schemes share a common characteristic structure: From the cryptosystem, one can define an additively homomorphic (over the integers) function f , such that when decrypting a ciphertext E pk (y), one obtains f (y) mod q where q is a modulus defined by the key used. Then from this number one can reconstruct y mod p as required, provided |y| ≤ M . For the Paillier case, f is the identity, and in the Regev case, we have f (x) = x · q/p . A semi-homomorphic cryptosystem with this extra structure is called a mixed modulus cryptosystem.
For such a scheme, when using the homomorphic property to compute, for instance, a E pk (y) + E pk (b) we get a ciphertext that "contains" af (y) + f (b) = f (ay + b). As before, if |ax + b| ≤ M , one can still decrypt correctly to ay + b mod p, despite the fact that we can only compute f (ax + b) mod q. We will say we have overflow if decryption does not work correctly.
We can now see that the idea of the attack on Paillier generalizes to any mixed modulus cryptosystem: the adversary can try to choose a, b carefully such that the occurrence of overflow depends on x. However, if we use the modification where we replace y by y + vp, we conjecture that the random choice of v will create enough uncertainty that the occurrence of overflow will be essentially independent of the choice of y. More precisely, the conjecture is Conjecture 1. For any mixed modulus semi-homomorphic cryptosystem, if we replace the encryption function E byĒ as defined above, the resulting cryptosystem is multiplication secure.
As evidence in favor of this we note that, as before, we can assume that the choice of operations the adversary does on the ciphertext is essentially independent of v. Note furthermore that in some of the examples such as Okamoto-Uchiyama, the adversary does not even know q.
To use multiplication security in the protocol, we can modify Π 2-MULT as shown in Figure 17 . To this end, we define a representation of a secret value z, denoted z ij = (E i (z i ), E j (z j )), where z = (z i + z j ) mod p. This is the same as the previous · notation except that only P i and P j hold shares of the value. We also define such a representation where only one party contributes an encryption, e.g. z i mod p = (E i (z i ), C 0 ), where C 0 is a default encryption of 0. Also note that, compared to standard offline phase, we have to adjust the values of τ and ρ to account for the addition of the random multiple of p inĒ. The idea in the protocol is to do two instances of the two-party multiplication protocol, with committed inputs and outputs and use one to to check the result of the other. (At this point of the protocol it has already been verified that the ciphertexts are (2 2u+log u τ, 2 2u+log u ρ)-ciphertexts). 2. For each k, Pi sends C k = x kĒj (y k ) +Ēj(r k ) to Pj. HereĒj(r k ) is a random (2 3u+log u τ 2 , 2 3u+log u τ ρ)-encryption under Pj's public key. 3. For each k, Pj decrypts C k to obtain v k , and outputs z k,j = v k mod p. Pi outputs z k,i = −r k mod p. 4. For each k, Pj computes Z k,j =Ēj(z k,j ) and sends to Pi. Pi computes Z k,i =Ēi(z k,i ) and sends to Pj. 5. ΠPoPK is used to verify that the Z k,i are well-formed ciphertexts and that Pi knows the z k,i 's. ΠPoPK is also used to verify that the Z k,j 's are well-formed and that Pj knows the z k,j 's. 6. Let z k = (z k,i + z k,j ) mod p. Based on the ciphertexts created now, we have representations as defined above of form x k ij , y k ij , z k mod p, where if parties followed the protocol x k y k = z k mod p. 7. We repeat Steps 1-6 again with new randomly chosen plaintexts, to create representations x k ij , y k ij , z k ij . However, x k is chosen randomly of bit length log τ + 2u, y k of length log τ + u, and z k of length 2 log τ + 3u. 8. As in protocol ΠTRIP, we now use the triple ( x k ij , y k ij , z k ij ) to check that ( x k ij , y k ij , z k ij ) satisfies x k y k = z k mod p. First, the parties invoke FRand to get a random u-bit challenge e. Then, they open e x k ij − x k ij to get ε k , and open y k ij − y k ij to get δ k . Finally, they open e z k ij − z k ij − δ k x k ij − ε k y k ij − ε k δ k and check that the result is 0 modulo p. If this is not the case, the protocol aborts. Note that the final check ensures that x k y k mod p = z k by the same argument as in Π TRIP , and since the x k , y k , z k are chosen sufficiently large, the check does not reveal any side information.
We can now replace E byĒ in the entire offline protocol and replace Π 2-MULT by Π 2-MULTNEW . In proving that the resulting protocol is secure, we can exploit the fact that a corrupt P i can be seen as an adversary A playing the multiplication security game: for any fixed k, the ciphertext D corresponds toĒ(y k ), the C to C k − Z k,i , and x corresponds to x k . The result of the final test tells the adversary whether C k − E k decrypts to x k y k mod p. Multiplication security now says that even given this information, the adversary cannot distinguish the correct value of y k from an independent random value. This is exactly equivalent to distinguishing the simulation of the offline phase from the real protocol: in the real protocol, the outputs from F TRIP are generated based on what is actually contained in the ciphertexts of honest players, while in the simulation, independent random values are used.
We therefore conclude that if the cryptosystem used is multiplication secure, then this modified offline protocol implements F TRIP , and we note that using Π 2-MULTNEW means that the amortized cost for a single two-party multiplication is O(κ + u) bits, no matter which multiplication secure cryptosystem we use.
B Benchmarks
An implementation of the on-line phase using a 65 -bit prime has been done in Python, with the following results, where each party ran on a 1 GHz dual-core AMD Opteron 2216 CPU with 2,1 Mb level 2 cache. These results are within a factor 3 of the time needed on the same platform for a secure multiplication using Shamir secret-sharing and assuming honest majority and semi-honest adversary.
A preliminary implementation has also been done of the off-line phase on the same platform, but a full set of benchmarks was not ready at time of writing. The results do suggest, however, that for the two party case and based on Paillier encryption with a 1024 bit modulus, the time for preparing a secure multiplication should be around 2-4 seconds, virtually independently of the value of the information theoretic security parameter u.
